






























































































































A. Hemerijck共著の“A Dutch Miracle " 






































GDP 2. 2% 1. 5% 
民間消費 2. 3% 1. 5% 
投資 1. 3% O. 2 % 
雇用 1. 5% -O. 5% 
失業率 6. 2 % 1 1. 1 % 




















































1983-93 194 195 196 197 
オランダ 1. 8 O. 8 2. 4 1. 9 2. 0 
EU O. 4 -O. 7 O. 5 O. 1 O. 4 
ベルギー O. 5 -0. 7 O. 3 O. 1 O. 5 
ドイツ* O. 7 -1. 8 -O. 3 -1. 2 -O. 9 
フランス O. 1 -O. 4 O. 9 -O. 2 O. 2 
デンマー ク O. 2 1. 2 1. 6 1. 0 1. 3 
スエー デン -O. 6 -O. 7 1. 6 -O. 6 -O. 4 
イギリス O. 6 1. 2 O. 8 O. 5 1. 3 





1983 1990 1996 1983 1990 1996 
オランダ 69.1 76. 2 76.6 34. 7 47.0 55.0 
EU 75.8 74. 2 69.8 42. 9 46. 7 48.4 
ベルギー 70.4 67. 3 67.3 36.6 41. 0 45.8 
ドイツ 76.6 76.4 73.4 47.8 52.8 54.3 
フランス 74.4 70.4 76.2 49. 7 50.6 52.1 
デンマー ク 78.4 82.5 81. 4 65.2 71. 5 67.8 
スエー デン 84. 7 86. 9 74. 7 75. 5 81. 1 70. 6 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































まった都市計画J. W 自治と分権~ 2001. 1. 
角橋徹也「オランダの住宅事情J.W住宅会議J1999.6. 
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At the end of the twentieth century， welfare states in Europe are challenged by changes 
in socio-economic environments， such as intensification of global competition， 
transformation of the world of work， and demographic changes related to aging and 
decreasing fertility. These require very difficult institutional changes in wage negotiation， 
social security system， labor market policy and others. 
The Netherlands， among them， has coped with this situation quite successfully and 
realized a so called “Dutch Miracle." The Dutch case of negotiated social policy reform 
proves that modernization of welfare state is possible， and we have a lot to learn from their 
expenence. 
The Dutch welfare state was developed and established on the post-war economic 
success. But their model depends on a high level of employment， which can become a 
weakness， especially combined with the ways of financing social security. The reliance on 
payroll taxes made this state quite vulnerable to increase in unemployment. In fact， the 
Netherlands was struck by very severe recession in the 1970s， which produced huge-scale 
unemployment. Generous social security system which allowed “welfare without work" 
contradiction ran into serious crisis. 
The first breakthrough to this stalemate was the Wassenaar Accord of 1982， which 
opened a path to wage moderation strategies， decentralization of labor negotiation and 
creation of part-time job. Government responded to this agreement and took concerted 
action to support the institutional changes. Tripartite corporatism was regained and 
mobilized to produce sustained job growth and other substantive outcomes. 
In the area of social security administration and implementation， in which many veto 
points have prevented changes and ‘rent seeking' behavior have been tolerated， al parties 
admitted that the Dutch social security system had been abused by claimants. It had been 
also mismanaged by social partners. They then agreed to initiate a series of reforms 
intended to increase the control of the public purse and limit direct administrative 
involvement of unions and employers. 
The third policy shift was introduced in the area of labor market policies in which 
various kinds of stimulating measures to create jobs have been enhanced. This 
unprecedented attempts resulted in a creation of new job opportunities for women and 
young unemployees. However， there stil remains ro 
